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Abstract
We compare and generalize various partial orderings of probability
forecasters according to the quality of their predictions. It appears that
the calibration requirement is quite at odds with the possibility of some
such ordering. However, if the requirements of calibration and identical
sets of debtors are relaxed, comparability obtains more easily. Taking
default predictions in the credit rating industry as an example, we show
for a data base of 5333 (Moody’s) and 6505 ten-year default predictions
(S&P), that Moody’s and S&P cannot be ordered neither according to
their grade distributions given default or non-default or to their Gini-
curves, but Moody’s dominate S&P with respect to the ROC-criterion.
Keywords: probability forecasts, rating systems, partial ordering
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1 Introduction
When talking about prediction, statisticians and econometricians usually con-
sider point forecasts: the rate of inflation next year, the population of the
earth in 2050, the coming budget deficit and so on. Of course, such point
forecasts (usually: of the first moment of a distribution) are rather crude sum-
maries of possible future events. Historically, this underlying insecurity has
mostly been dealt with by attaching a probability distribution to these point
forecasts, whereas forecasting the complete distribution of future events is of
rather recent origin (See Gneiting (2008) or Gneiting and Katzfuss (2014) for
a survey, in particular with respect to applications in meteorology, or Groen
et al. (2013) for an application in economics).
This paper considers the special case of forecasting a Bernoulli variable
with values 0 and 1. Other than in the case of continuous variables, fore-
casting the distribution has engendered an enormous literature here. Obvious
applications are default predictions in consumer credit scoring and in the credit
rating industry, or weather forecasts, where statements like: "The probability
of rain in Chicago tomorrow is 20%" have been common for quite a while.
Other applications are forecasting the probability of a recession (see Kauppi
and Saikkonen (2008)). For concreteness, however, most of the discussion
below will be phrased in terms of defaults and non-defaults. While the pro-
duction of such forecasts has been heavily discussed both in the statistics and
economics literature (see e.g. Creal et al. (2014) for a new method based on
credit default swaps), much less is known about evaluating their relative perfor-
mance. Section 2 summarizes previous results and suggests various extensions.
It appears that the concept of calibration (DeGroot and Fienberg (1983)) is
a rather tough requirement which prevents most probability forecasters from
being unequivocally comparable. Section 3 extends previous comparability re-
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sults to nonidentical sets of debtors and section 4 applies our results to default
prediction made by the leading rating agencies Moody’s and S&P.
2 Partial orderings of probability forecasts
There are two ways of comparing probability forecasters A and B. First, by
computing scoring rules such as the well-known Brier-Score
S =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(θi − pi)2, (1)
where n is the number of forecasts made, θi ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the
event in question has occurred (θ = 1) or not (θ = 0), and where pi is the
forecasted probability of the event in trial no. i (Winkler 1996). Second, by
comparing complete distributions of forecasts, as will be done below. This
allows statements such as "A is better than B irrespective of any scoring rule
from some class of scoring rules" (see Krämer (2006)), but has the disadvantage
that certain pairs of forecasters cannot be ranked (e.g. this method provides
only a partial ordering). It can be shown that it is then possible to find sensible
(in the sense of "proper", see Krämer (2006)) scoring rules such that A is better
than B according to rule no. 1 and B is better than A according to rule no.
2. Krämer and Güttler (2008) provide an example where, for an identical set
of private enterprises, Moody’s provides better default forecasts than S&P for
some scoring rules, while S&P is better for others.
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < . . . < ak = 1 be the probabilities that are available as
forecasts for the future event in question. We take k to be small and finite
here (for generalizations see Schervish (1989)). For instance, the US National
Weather Service has only multiples of 10% as predicted probabilities of rain,
so k = 11 (including 0% and 100%). In the credit rating industry, the major
agencies have 7 different rating categories with up to three rating modifiers
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each resulting in a maximum of 21 different grades including a default category.
Typically, the worst four categories are combined into one, so there are usually
17 categories.
We are not concerned here with the methods by which default forecasts are
produced. Rather, we take forecasts as given and take forecasters to be defined
by the discrete bivariate probability function r(θi, aj), i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , k,
resulting from some such method, whichever it may be, with θ = 1 indicating
default and θ = 0 indicating non-default.
Of course, the true bivariate probability function r(θi, aj) is known only
after infinitely many trials. In practice we take its empirical counterpart as a
suitable approximation. As this paper is focused on fundamental problems of
comparability, this sampling issue is ignored below (see however Krämer and
Güttler (2008) for some discussion of the statistical significance of observed
differences in ranking quality).
Without loss of generality, the set A = {a1, ..., ak} of available probabilities
can be taken as identical for all forecasters involved. If not, define A :=
AA ∪ AB. Following Vardeman and Meeden (1983), the following additional
notation will be used:
p(1) :=
∑
j r(1, aj) = overall probability of default (PD)
p(0) :=
∑
j r(0, aj) = overall probability of no default (probability of
survival PS).
q(aj) := probability with which default forecast aj is made.
p(1|aj) := r(1,aj)q(aj) = conditional probability of default given forecast aj.
p(0|aj) := r(0,aj)q(aj) = conditional probability of survival given forecast aj.
q(aj|1) := r(1,aj)p(1) = conditional probability of prediction aj given default.
q(aj|0) := r(0,aj)p(0) = conditional probability of prediction aj given no
default.
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The problem is: given two forecasters A and B, characterized by their re-
spective bivariate probability functions rA(θi, aj) and rB(θi, aj), which one is
"better"?
One sensible requirement is that among borrowers with predicted default
probability aj, the relative percentage of defaults is equal to aj. Formally:
aj
!
= p(1|aj) = r(1, aj)
q(aj)
(2)
whenever q(aj) > 0. Such forecasters are called "well calibrated" (DeGroot
and Fienberg (1983)).
This calibration requirement has various consequences for the bivariate
probability function r(θi, aj). For instance, it is obvious from (2) that, given
predicted aj of the future event and the r(1, aj), the marginal frequencies
q(aj) and therefore also the q(aj|0) and the r(0, aj) are fixed. These limited
degrees of freedom for obtaining a bivariate probability function r(θi, aj) that
is compatible with calibration are further reduced by the requirement that
∑
q(aj) = q(0) +
k∑
j=2
r(1, aj)
aj
= r(0, 0) + r(1, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
k∑
j=2
r(1, aj)
aj
= 1. (3)
These relationships are probably best clarified via a numerical example.
Assume that among the aj’s, there is 0.2 and 0.4 and that r(1, 0.2) = 0.1 and
r(1, 0.4) = 0.2, as in the following table:
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Table 1: A well calibrated probability forecaster
aj
. . . 0.2 . . . 0.4 . . .
r(1, aj) 0 0.1 0 0.2 0
q(aj) 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
r(0, aj) 0 0.4 0 0.3 0
q(aj|1) 0 1/3 0 2/3 0
q(aj|0) 0 4/7 0 3/7 0
Then the first 4 entries in the table completely determine the rest. In partic-
ular, there can only be zeros in the columns where aj /∈ {0.2, 0.4}. Also, the
marginal probabilities p(1) = 0.3 and p(0) = 0.7 follow immediately from
r(1, 0.2) = 0.1 and r(1, 0.4) = 0.2.
These restrictions will be vital in establishing various relationships between
partial orderings below.
The first such partial ordering relies on "refinement" (DeGroot and Fien-
berg (1983)). We say that A is more refined than B, in symbols A ≥R B, if
there exists a k × k Markov matrix M (i.e. a matrix with nonnegative entries
whose columns sum to unity) such that
qB(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijq
A(aj), and (4)
aiq
B(ai) =
k∑
j=1
Mijajq
A(aj), i = 1, . . . , k. (5)
Equation (4) means that, given A’s forecast aj, an additional independent
randomization is applied according to the conditional distribution Mij(j =
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1, . . . , k) which produces forecasts with the same probability function as that
of B. Condition 5 ensures that the resulting forecast is again well calibrated.
The concept of refinement easily extends to forecasters which are not nec-
essarily well calibrated. Again following DeGroot and Fienberg (1983), we say
that A is sufficient for B - in symbols: A ≥s B - if, for some Markov matrix
M ,
qB(ai|θ) =
k∑
j=1
Mijq
A(aj|θ), i = 1, . . . , k; θ = 0, 1. (6)
Vardeman and Meeden (1983) suggest to alternatively order probability
forecasters according to the concentration of defaults in the "bad" grades.
This will here be called the VM-default order. Formally:
A ≥VM(d) B :⇔
j∑
i=1
qA(ai|1) ≤
j∑
i=1
qB(ai|1), j = 1, . . . , k. (7)
Or to put this differently: A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden default
ordering if its conditional distribution, given default, first-order stochastically
dominates that of B.
The same can be done for the non-defaults. A is better than B in the
VM-non-default sense if survivors are more frequent in the "good" grades.
Formally:
A ≥VM(nd) B :⇔
j∑
i=1
qA(ai|0) ≥
j∑
i=1
qB(ai|0), j = 1, . . . , k. (8)
Finally, A dominates B in the Vardeman-Meeden sense (in symbols A ≥VM B)
if both A ≥VM(d) B and A ≥VM(nd) B obtain.
Table 2 provides an example. It extends table 1 to the case where an
additional forecaster is involved. It is easily checked that both forecasters are
well calibrated and that B dominates A in the Vardeman-Meeden-non-default-
ordering. However, A and B cannot be ranked according to VM(d) (it will
emerge below that this is no coincidence).
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Table 2: Two well calibrated forecasters
aj
0.2 0.25 0.4 1
Forecaster A
rA(1, aj) 0.1 0 0.2 0
qA(aj) 0.5 0 0.5 0
rA(0, aj) 0.4 0 0.3 0
qA(aj|1) 1/3 0 2/3 0
qA(aj|0) 4/7 0 3/7 0
Forecaster B
rB(1, aj) 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.05
qB(aj) 0.5 0.2 0.25 0.05
rB(0, aj) 0.4 0.15 0.15 0
qB(aj|1) 1/3 1/6 1/3 1/6
qB(aj|0) 8/14 3/14 3/14 0
It is also easily seen that B is more refined than A: Putting all of B’s
forecasts from the 0.25 and 1 brackets into the 0.4 bracket yields forecasts
which are identical in distribution to A.
A related criterion which seems to be favoured in the banking community
is based on joining the points
(0, 0), (
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i),
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|1)), j = 1, . . . , k (9)
by straight lines. The resulting plot is variously called the power curve, the
Lorenz curve, the Gini curve, or the cumulative accuracy profile (see e.g. En-
gelmann and Hayden and Tasche (2003)), and a forecaster A is considered
better than a forecaster B in this - the Gini-default-sense (formally: A ≥G B)
- if A’s Gini curve is nowhere below that of B. It is easily checked that then
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A’s Gini-curves for survivors is nowhere above that of B, so arguing in terms
of survivors does not add anything new.
As figure 1 shows, B is in the above example also Gini-dominating A:
Although both curves coincide from 0.5 upwards, A’s curve is below that of B
to the left of 0.5.
Figure 1: Gini-ordering of forecasters A and B from table 2
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Finally, rather than looking at the Gini-curve, it is common in medical
applications to consider the ROC-curve instead, defined by the points
(0, 0), (
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|0),
j−1∑
i=0
q(ak−i|1)), j = 1, ..., k . (10)
With identical right marginals, this does not imply anything new. Figure 2
shows the ROC-curves corresponding to the Gini-curves from figure 1. It is
seen that both Gini-curves shift leftwards, and that B keeps dominating A.
Our first result shows that this is no coincidence:
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Figure 2: ROC-curves of forecasters A and B from table 2
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Theorem 1:
For probability forecasters A and B with pA(1) = pB(1), the Gini-curves in-
tersect if and only if the ROC-curves intersect.
Proof:
For ease of notation, let p be the overall default probability and let Aj =∑j−1
i=0 q
A(ak−i), A1j =
∑j−1
i=0 q
A(ak−i | 1), A0j =
∑j−1
i=0 q
A(ak−i | 0).
Similarly for B. Then the Gini-curve and the ROC-curve are defined by the
points (Ai, A1i) (Gini) and (A0i, A1i) (ROC) respectively. Similarly for B.
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And A dominates B in the Gini- and ROC-sense, respectively, if and only if
A1i
Ai
≥ B1i
Bi
(Gini) or (11)
A1i
A0i
≥ B1i
B0i
(ROC) (12)
However, from
Ai = pA1i + (1− p)A0i
we have
A1i
Ai
=
A1i
p(A1i + (1− p)A0i
=
1
p+ (1− p)A0i
A1i
,
which is monotonously increasing in A1i
A0i
. The same holds for B1i
B0i
. Therefore,
the relationships (11) and (12) are equivalent.
Both the Gini-curve and the ROC-curves do not require predicted default
probabilities - sorting the debtors into classes with increasing default proba-
bility suffices. They are also both convex if forecasters are semi-calibrated, i.e.
if p(1 | ai) is a non decreasing function of ai. This is a minimum requirement
we will stick to in what follows.
As both the Gini and the ROC-curve are invariant under monotone trans-
formations of the predicted default probabilities aj, the ordering implied by
them is no longer a partial ordering: From A ≥ B and B ≥ A one can no
longer infer that A = B ("antisymmetry"). But transitivity persists. Or-
derings of this type are called pre-orderings, and it will be seen in the next
section that the VM-ordering likewise violates the antisymmetry-condition if
the restriction of identical right marginals is relaxed.
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3 Generalizations and relationships among the
orderings
Theorem 1 does not extend to pA(1) 6= pB(1), as can be shown by simple
counterexamples. Also, the calibration requirement severely restricts both the
entries in the r(θi, aj)-matrix and the chances that two probability forecasters
can be compared in the first place. In particular, Krämer (2005) shows that
for well calibrated forecasters A and B, if qA(0) = qB(0) = 0, then A and B
cannot be strictly ordered according to ≥VM(d). And if qA(1) = qB(1) = 0,
then A and B cannot be strictly ordered according to ≥VM(nd). The example
in table 2 where ≥VM(nd) obtains is therefore an artefact of qB(1) > 0.
Comparability is much easier if the calibration requirement is abandoned.
Even for identical right marginals, Krämer (2005) shows that the unrestricted
VM-ordering might then obtain, in which case it implies the Gini-ordering.
Given semi-calibration (i.e. p(1|aj) is non decreasing in a), the Gini-ordering
is also implied by sufficiency. The Gini-ordering is thus the least demanding
of the bunch in the case of identical right marginals. Still, in practice, most
forecasters do not seem to be comparable at all.
Therefore, we now also abandon the restriction pA(1) = pB(1). In practice,
this means that we can now consider non-calibrated forecasters for different
populations with different overall default probabilities. In particular, it can
now be shown via simple examples that the VM-ordering might obtain even
in case of calibration.
For the Gini-ordering, it can now happen that B’s Gini-curve is better than
A’s for defaults and worse for non-defaults, and we say that B dominates A in
the Gini-sense if it does so both for defaults and non-defaults. In that case, it
is easily seen that ≥G keeps on defining a preordering.
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As to the relationship between ≥VM and ≥Gini, neither implies the other
under these more general circumstances, as can be shown by simple counterex-
amples. Also, unlike in the case of identical right marginals, the Gini and ROC
orderings are no longer identical when right marginals are different. It is easy
to find examples where A ≥ROC B but A and B cannot be ordered according
to ≥G. Rather, we now have the following result:
Theorem 2:
For arbitrary bivariate probability functions rA(θi, aj), rB(θi, aj) and semi-
calibrated forecasters A and B, we have
A ≥G B ⇒ A ≥ROC B.
The converse does not hold.
Proof:
In the notation from Theorem 1, A ≥G B is equivalent to
A1i
Ai
≥ B1i
Bi
(19)
(i.e. A’s Gini-curve for defaults is above that of B’s) and
A0i
Ai
≤ B0i
Bi
(20)
(i.e. A’s Gini-curve for non-defaults is below that of B’s). However, from (20)
we have
Ai
A0i
≥ Bi
B0i
(21)
and multiplying the left and right side of (19) with the left and right side of
(21) yields
A1i
A0i
≥ B1i
B0i
, (22)
which by the definition means A ≥ROC B. That the converse is false can be
shown by simple counterexamples.
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From Theorem 2 it is clear that the ROC-ordering is the least demanding
in practice, as will also be verified by our empirical example below.
4 Application
Our data are from the Moody’s and S&P websites, respectively, from where
we obtained the rating history of 5333 (Moody’s) and 6505 private compa-
nies (S&P), covering the periods 1971-2014 (Moody’s) and 1981 - 2014 (S&P)
(see Standard & Poor’s (2015) and Moody’s (2015)). For each company, we
recorded its first rating and its default state ten years after. Table 3 shows
the results. PD is the percentage of defaults, and q(ai) denotes the relative
frequency of rating class ai, as defined in section 1. For instance, 24.26%
of Moody’s costumers and 22.94% of S&P’s costumers were initially rated A
(among which 2.09% defaulted within 10 years in case of Moody’s and among
which 1.71% defaulted in the case of S&P). Overall, we recorded 2301 defaults
among debtors rated by S&P and 1938 defaults rated by Moodys, correspond-
ing to PM(1) = 15.43% and P S&P (1) = 12.74%.
Table 3: Empirical ten year default rates (PD) and distribution of debtors
among rating classes
Moodys S&P
Rating Class PD q(ai) PD q(ai)
AAA/Aaa 0.49 3.41 0.71 1.07
AA/Aa 0.89 11.50 0.78 7.13
A 2.09 24.26 1.71 22.94
BBB/Baa 4.95 23.18 4.98 26.15
BB/Ba 19.79 14.23 16.38 17.37
B 40.25 17.86 29.97 22.77
CCC/Caa-C 65.97 5.54 51.35 2.56
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Table 4 gives the resulting bivariate probability distribution if we view
the empirical default rates in the various rating classes as predicted default
probabilities (i. e. if we assume that both agencies are well calibrated), after
incorporating the respective distribution of creditors across rating grades.
From table 4, one readily obtains the conditional probabilities qMoodys(ai|1),
qS&P (ai|1), qMoodys(ai|0), qS&P (ai|1), and it emerges that none of the relation-
ships (7) or (8) obtains (see table 5). Thus, Moody’s and S&P cannot be
ranked in either the VM -default nor non-default sense. However, as figures 3
and 4 show, the Gini-curve for defaults of S&P is below and the Gini-curve for
survivors is above that of Moody’s, so Gini-domination obtains.
Table 4: Bivariate probability distribution across rating classes and default
states
Moodys S&P
ai q(ai) r(0, ai) r(1, ai) q(ai) r(0, ai) r(1, ai)
0.49 3.41 3.39 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 1.06 0.01
0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.13 7.07 0.06
0.89 11.50 11.40 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.94 22.55 0.39
2.09 24.26 23.75 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.95 23.18 22.03 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.15 24.85 1.30
16.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.37 14.52 2.85
19.79 14.23 11.41 2.82 0.00 0.00 0.00
29.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.77 15.95 6.82
40.25 17.86 10.67 7.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
51.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.56 1.25 1.31
65.97 5.54 1.89 3.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 5: Cumulated sums of defaults and non-defaults
Moodys S&P
ai
∑j
i=1 q(ai|0)
∑j
i=1 q(ai|1)
∑j
i=1 q(ai|0)
∑j
i=1 q(ai|1)
0.49 4.01 0.11 0.00 0.00
0.71 4.01 0.11 1.22 0.06
0.78 4.01 0.11 9.33 0.50
0.89 17.49 0.77 9.33 0.50
1.71 17.49 0.77 35.17 3.57
2.09 45.59 4.06 35.17 3.57
4.95 71.65 11.49 35.17 3.57
4.98 71.65 11.49 63.65 13.80
16.38 71.65 11.49 80.30 36.13
19.79 85.15 29.74 80.30 36.13
29.97 85.15 29.74 98.57 89.68
40.25 97.77 76.32 98.57 89.68
51.35 97.77 76.32 100.00 100.00
65.97 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
17
Figure 3: Gini-ordering (default)
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Figure 4: Gini-ordering (non-default)
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From Theorem 2, it is therefore no surprise that Moody’s doimantes S&P
as with respect to the ROC-criterion, as shown in figure 5.
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Figure 5: ROC-curves
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